

# A Talk on Quantum Cryptography

or

## How Alice Outwits Eve

by

**Samuel J. Lomonaco, Jr.**

CSEE Department  
University of Marland Baltimore County  
Baltimore, MD 21250

Email: [Lomonaco@UMBC.EDU](mailto:Lomonaco@UMBC.EDU)

WebPage: <http://www.umbc.edu/~lomonaco>

Quantum Cryptography provides a new mechanism enabling the parties communicating with one another to:

Automatically detect eavesdropping.

Consequently, it provides a means of determining when ~~a communi~~ an encrypted communication has been compromised.

### TYPES OF COMMUNICATION SECURITY

- PERFECT SECURITY(Shannon, 1949)


Ciphertext  $C$  without key gives no information  
plaintext  $P$

$$Prob(P | C) = Prob(P)$$

- PRACTICAL SECRECY(Circa  $10^6$  BC)

Cipher text breakable after  $x$  years

Example: DES



## TYPES OF COMMUNICATION SECURITY (Cont.)

- COMPUTATIONAL SECURITY (Diffie-Hellman, circa 1970)

Public Key Crypto Systems


Example: RSA

9

- COMPUTATIONAL SECURITY (Diffie-Hellman, circa 1970)

Public Key Crypto Systems

Example: RSA



10


# The Classical World

- PROBLEM: Long random bit sequences must be sent over a secure channel
- CATCH 22: There are perfectly good ways to communicate in secret provided we can communicate in secret ...
- KEY PROBLEM IN CRYPTOGRAPHY: Need some way of securely communicating key.

The

Quantum

World



Where does a Qubit Live ?

$\mathcal{H}$  =



Home

**Definition.** A **Hilbert space** is a vector space over the complex numbers  $\mathbb{C}$  together with an inner product

$$\mathcal{H} \times \mathcal{H} \rightarrow \mathbb{C}$$

such that

- 1)  $\langle u_1 + u_2, v \rangle = \langle u_1, v \rangle + \langle u_2, v \rangle$  and  
 $\langle u, v_1 + v_2 \rangle = \langle u, v_1 \rangle + \langle u, v_2 \rangle$
- 2)  $\langle u, \lambda v \rangle = \lambda \langle u, v \rangle$
- 3)  $\overline{\langle u, v \rangle} = \langle v, u \rangle$
- 4) For ever Cauchy sequence  $u_1, u_2, u_3, \dots$  in  $\mathcal{H}$ ,


$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} u_n \in \mathcal{H}$$

The elements of  $\mathcal{H}$  will be called **kets**, and will be denoted by


$| \text{label} \rangle$

A qubit is a Ket (State) in a 2-D Hilbert Space  $\mathcal{H}$

# Quantum Copying Machine ? <sup>I.</sup>



# Quantum Copying Machine ?



Wootters & Zurek  
& Dieks

No Cloning Theorem

# Dirac Notation (cont.)

$$\hbar = 1$$

- Consider a Quantum System in the state

$$\frac{|\psi\rangle}{\text{Ket}}$$

- Suppose we measure many times the observable

$$\frac{A}{\text{Hermitian operator}}$$

- Then the average value for many measurements of  $A$  is:

$$\langle \psi | (A | \psi \rangle) = \langle \psi | A | \psi \rangle$$

$$= \langle A \rangle$$

Avg. of  $A$

Definition 0.1 Observables  $A$  and  $B$  are COMPATIBLE if

$$[A, B] = AB - BA = 0$$

Otherwise,  $A$  and  $B$  are INCOMPATIBLE.

Let

$$\Delta A = A - \langle A \rangle$$

## HEISENBERG'S UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE

$$\langle (\Delta A)^2 \rangle \langle (\Delta B)^2 \rangle \geq \frac{1}{4} \| \langle [A, B] \rangle \|^2$$

$\langle (\Delta A)^2 \rangle$  is the the STANDARD DEVIATION. It is a measure in the uncertainty in the observable  $A$ .



$$\hbar = 1$$

### Observables

- $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} X \\ P \end{array} \right.$  Position Operator
- Momentum Operator

Note:  $X$  &  $P$  are incompatible observables; for:

$$[X, P] = -i \neq 0$$


Therefore, by Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle,

$$\langle (\Delta X)^2 \rangle \langle (\Delta P)^2 \rangle \geq \frac{1}{4} \|[X, P]\|^2 = \frac{1}{4}$$



Ergo, to know precisely which of the two slits the electron passed through forces the momentum to be uncertain.

- IDEA: Heisenberg uncertainty can be used to detect eavesdropping by Eve when a key  $R$  is sent.
- But HOW do we exploit Heisenberg uncertainty to detect Eve's eavesdropping?



## TYPES OF COMMUNICATION SECURITY (Cont.)

- QUANTUM SECRECY (Bennett-Brassard, 1984)

Built-in detection of eavesdropping

(Without Noise)

17  
18

## BB84 QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOL

- The vertical and horizontal polarization states,  $|\uparrow\rangle$  and  $|\leftrightarrow\rangle$  resp, form a basis of  $\mathcal{H}$  which we will call the vertical/horizontal (V/H) basis  $\boxplus$ .

- The slanted polarization states  $|\nearrow\rangle$  and  $|\nwarrow\rangle$  form another basis of  $\mathcal{H}$  which we will call the oblique basis  $\boxtimes$ .

- For the V/H basis  $\boxplus$ , Alice & Bob agree to communicate via the following quantum alphabet:

$$\begin{cases} \text{"1"} &= |\uparrow\rangle \\ \text{"0"} &= |\leftrightarrow\rangle \end{cases}$$

- For the oblique basis  $\boxtimes$ , Alice & Bob agree to communicate via the following quantum alphabet:


$$\begin{cases} \text{"1"} &= |\nearrow\rangle \\ \text{"0"} &= |\nwarrow\rangle \end{cases}$$

- Because of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, Alice & Bob know that observations with respect to the  $\boxplus$  basis are incompatible with observation with respect to the  $\boxtimes$  basis.

- So Alice communicates to Bob by randomly choosing between the two quantum alphabets  $\boxplus$  and  $\boxtimes$ .


- Over the quantum channel, Alice sends her message to Bob, randomly choosing between the quantum alphabets for each bit sent
- Over a public channel, Bob communicates to Alice which quantum alphabets he used for each measurement
- Over the public channel, Alice responds by telling Bob which of his measurements were made with the correct alphabet.
- Alice & Bob then delete all bits for which they used incompatible quantum alphabets to produce their resulting RAW KEYS.
- If Eve has not eavesdropped, then their two RAW keys will be the same.

- Over the public channel, Alice & Bob compare common small portions of their RAW KEYS, and then delete the disclosed bits from their RAW KEY to produce their FINAL KEY.
- If Alice & Bob find through their public disclosure revealed no errors, then they know that Eve was not present, and now share a common FINAL KEY.



Alice                  Eve                  Bob

49



Alice                  Eve                  Bob

50

PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION: Distilling a smaller secret key from a larger partially secret key

PREAMBLE TO PRIV. AMP.

- Alice and Bob begin by permuting raw key with a publically disclosed random permutation
- Alice and Bob publically compare some blocks of raw key to estimate error rate  $Q$ .
- Alice and Bob discard any portion of the raw key that was publically disclosed
- $Q \geq Threshold \Rightarrow$  Priv. Amp. not possible. Restart everything!

If  $Q < Threshold$ , then priv. amp. begins

- Based on  $Q$ , Alice and Bob estimate that  $\leq k$  bits out of  $n$  known by Eve
- Let  $s =$  a security parameter to be adjusted as required.
- Alice & Bob compute the parities of  $n - k - s$  publically chosen random subsets
- Both Alice and Bob keep these parities secret. These parities form the final secret key.

B92 Protocol

- Use 2-dim.  $\mathcal{H}$  for polarized photons
- Quantum Alphabet

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 1 = |\oplus\rangle = \left| \begin{array}{c} \uparrow \\ \nearrow \end{array} \right\rangle \\ 0 = |\ominus\rangle = \left| \begin{array}{c} \downarrow \\ \nwarrow \end{array} \right\rangle \end{array} \right.$$

$$0 < \theta < \frac{\pi}{2}$$

$$\therefore \langle \oplus | \ominus \rangle = \sin 2\theta$$

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} A_{\oplus} = \frac{1 - |\ominus\rangle\langle\ominus|}{1 + \langle\oplus|\ominus\rangle} \\ A_{\ominus} = \frac{1 - |\oplus\rangle\langle\oplus|}{1 + \langle\oplus|\ominus\rangle} \\ A_{?} = 1 - A_{\oplus} - A_{\ominus} \end{array} \right.$$

non-commuting  
observable.

### OPAQUE EAVESDROPPING

Eve intercepts Alice's message, and she masquerades as Alice by sending her received message to Bob.

### TRANSLUCENT EAVESDROPPING WITHOUT ENTANGLEMENT

Eve makes the information carrier interact unitarily with her probe, and then letting it proceed on to Bob in a slightly modified state.

$$|\oplus\rangle |\psi\rangle \implies |\oplus'\rangle |\psi_+\rangle$$

or

$$|\ominus\rangle |\psi\rangle \implies |\ominus'\rangle |\psi_-\rangle$$

where  $|\psi\rangle$  denotes the state of the probe.



## Next ?

- Earth/satellite communication
  - Proposed by Franson Hughes
- Single photon sources
  - Stanford Univ.

## Difficulties

- Multi-User Quantum Crypto Protocols
  - Substantial Progress has been made
- Proof that Quantum Crypto Protocols are imperious to all possible eavesdropping strategies.